One of the most remarkable facts about the events of 9/11 is the unanimity among the press, governments, religious institutions, unions, anti-war organizations and many other groups in accepting, endorsing and propagating the official story of 9/11: that a structural trauma from hijacked aircraft and fires was a prelude to an unstoppable gravity-based collapse that destroyed the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center. It is a false story that has been propagated with minimal examination of the forensic evidence to determine whether the facts support, discredit or raise questions.
The following two statements are both erroneous and yet remain unquestioned by the mainstream body politic: “Nineteen Muslims hijacked four planes, destroyed the Twin Towers and damaged the Pentagon thereby launching the Global War on Terror” and “The atomic bombing of Japan quickly ended the war.” The first is patently false as demonstrated by a growing number of 9/11 truth activists, scholars and investigators. The latter is also false because it fails to acknowledge that the Japanese were willing to surrender and thus end the war, but as the record shows, the Allies would only accept surrender after they had dropped their bombs.
In the last few years I have become aware of the background of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in which the government, media and social norms have defined an acceptable public story that is so incomplete as to be completely wrong. The erroneous nature of this story was amplified during my recent visit to the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. While debates about the necessity of the atomic bombings still simmers in academic circles, any attempt at bringing a so-called “revisionist” version into public discourse is blocked.
Through assiduous research, my viewpoint has now become the following: Contrary to what is taught in school and reiterated in the public record, the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs were not what ended World War II. Rather, the bombings were largely a science experiment performed on a civilian population and had no military benefit whatsoever.
Given the abhorrence and condemnation that has been heaped upon German doctors that performed science experiments on live subjects during WW II, it is no surprise that any reporting of the atomic bombings as a science experiment performed on a civilian population would need to be vehemently denied to this day. The sanitizing of the event began shortly after the event and has been absent from public discussions ever since.
The worldwide nuclear abolition movement reminds the world of the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but rarely recounts the motivations for the use of those weapons. Instead the nuclear abolition movement focuses on the dire consequences for all humanity in the event of a future nuclear war. By omitting the motivations for the first atomic bombings, the world stands to be blindsided to the political whims that could unleash such weapons again.
This article will not attempt to resolve the debate over the many layers of issues surrounding the atomic bombings of Japan. Rather, it will highlight some of the key facts surrounding the use of the atomic bombs that have been expunged from public discussions, and then draw parallels about how key data regarding the events of 9/11 were similarly expunged. The sanitizing of incongruous facts by the media and government was a process deployed in full force almost simultaneous with the events on September 11, 2001, to likewise propagate a grandiose lie.
Academic Debate over the Atomic Bombings
The academic debates over the merits of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have raged since the first mushroom cloud appeared over Hiroshima, and have continued unabated. In recent decades, the increase in declassified materials has shed additional light onto the dynamics of the decision to drop bombs on Japanese cities. This additional information has strengthened the arguments of the “revisionist historians” even though the atomic bomb “debunkers” continue to assert that “the atomic bombing of Japan quickly ended the war.”
In 1995, preparations for an exhibit of the Enola Gay by the Smithsonian Institute sparked a controversy. The exhibit had intended to present the assertion that "the use of the bombs led to the immediate surrender of Japan and made unnecessary the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands." As the controversy about the descriptions for the items in the exhibit grew, 95 historians signed a letter protesting the information developed to accompany the exhibit. The letter to the Smithsonian stated, in part:
"… it is also a fact that even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed, the Japanese still insisted that Emperor Hirohito be allowed to remain emperor as a condition of surrender. Only when that assurance was given did the Japanese agree to surrender. This was precisely the clarification of surrender terms that many of Truman's own top advisors had urged on him in the months prior to Hiroshima.”
That clarification was communicated to the Japanese through intermediaries on the evening of August 9th – once the entire supply of atomic bombs in the United States arsenal had been used.
Selection of Target Cities
The selection of the cities to be bombed was based on a number of factors. According to declassified historical documents in the U.S. archives, Washington started work on selecting possible targets for the atomic bombs in Japan in April, 1945. Major General Leslie Groves, who oversaw the Manhattan Project (the top secret project that developed the world’s first nuclear weapons), convened the inaugural meeting of the target committee on April 27, 1945. The documents state that the targets should be no less than three miles (about 4.8 kilometers) in diameter, be located between Tokyo and Nagasaki and have a high strategic value. Among the criteria laid out by the target committee was that the bombs were to be visually released – i.e., allowing the filming of the detonation – so as to achieve the most effective (e.g. scientific) use of the bomb.
Later, the members of the target committee agreed that cities already extensively damaged by U.S. air raids would not be desirable targets. The documents show that U.S. military wanted the first use of atomic bombs to be dropped on a dense urban center to determine the destructive power of the bomb. Eleven of the 17 targets chosen at the meeting included Tokyo Bay, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Nagoya, Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yawata (in Kita-Kyushu), Fukuoka, Nagasaki and Sasebo.
The committee’s second session, held on May 10-11, studied five cities as well as the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. For the primary target list, Kyoto and Hiroshima were picked. Yokohama and Kokura (in Kita-Kyushu) were placed on the secondary target list.
A “top secret” document dated May 15, 1945, from the headquarters of the 20th Air Force in Washington to the commander of the unit of B-29 bombers in Guam issued an order: “It is directed no bombing attacks be made against the following targets without specific authorization from this headquarters. These targets are the cities of Hiroshima, Kyoto and Niigata.” At the insistence of War Secretary Henry Stimson, Kyoto was removed from the list. It was reported that Stimson feared that Japan could side with the Soviet Union out of fierce resentment toward Washington for destroying Japan’s cultural center. As a result, Hiroshima became the primary target, followed by Kokura.
The world’s first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. Three days later, the second atomic bombing mission headed to Kokura. However, poor visibility of the city forced the bomber to drop the weapon on Nagasaki instead.
Timing of the Invasion
The timing of the invasion of the Japanese mainland was envisioned by military planners to begin no earlier than the end of 1945 and possibly well into 1946. These feasible dates for an invasion were three-to-eight months after the bombing of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Allowing the question to be asked; “What was the hurry to use the atomic bombs on Japan?”
In April, 1945, with Japan reeling under the allied assault, General MacArthur had little doubt that sufficient forces could be massed to overcome Japanese resistance in an invasion of Kyushu in the Fall of 1945. He stated his reasons as follows:
I am of the opinion that the ground, naval, air, and logistic resources in the Pacific are adequate to carry out Course III. The Japanese Fleet has been reduced to practical impotency. The Japanese Air Force has been reduced to a line of action which involves unco-ordinated, suicidal attacks against our forces, employing all types of planes, including trainers. Its attrition is heavy and its power for sustained action is diminishing rapidly. Those conditions will be accentuated after the establishment of our air forces in the Ryukyus. With the increase in the tempo of very long range attacks, the enemy's ability to provide replacement planes will diminish and the Japanese potentiality will decline at an increasing rate. It is believed that the development of air bases in the Ryukyus will, in conjunction with carrier-based planes, give us sufficient air power to support landings on Kyushu and that the establishment of our air forces there will ensure complete air supremacy over Honshu. Logistic considerations present the most difficult problem.
On March 29, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, working on the assumptions that the war in Europe would be over by July 1, 1945, and that the forthcoming Okinawa operation would be concluded by mid-August of 1945, they set a tentative schedule for the invasion of Japan. The invasion plan was assigned the cover name "Downfall" and consisted of two main operations: "Olympic," the preliminary assault on the southern island of Kyushu, which was slated for December 1, 1945, and "Coronet," the subsequent landing on Honshu, which was scheduled for March 1, 1946.
The Rush to Bomb
As stated in the letter from the 95 historians, the military planners thought it highly probable that the Japanese would surrender well before the earliest possible invasion. Responding to the Smithsonian’s proposed exhibit label which asserted,
"It was thought highly unlikely that Japan, while in a very weakened military condition, would have surrendered unconditionally without such an invasion."
The historians replied:
Nowhere in the exhibit is this interpretation balanced by other views. Visitors to the exhibit will not learn that many U.S. leaders – including Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Admiral William D. Leahy, War Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy – thought it highly probable that the Japanese would surrender well before the earliest possible invasion, scheduled for November, 1945. It is spurious to assert as fact that obliterating Hiroshima in August was needed to obviate an invasion in November.
Anecdotal Story of the USS Indianapolis
As anecdotal story supporting the urgent rush to use the atomic bombs (before Japan could potentially capitulate) and preclude the use the new weapons) is the story of the USS Indianapolis.
After major repairs and an overhaul, Indianapolis received orders to proceed to Tinian Island, carrying parts and the enriched uranium (about half of the world's supply of Uranium-235 at the time) for the atomic bomb Little Boy, which would later be dropped on Hiroshima. Indianapolis departed San Francisco's Hunters Point Naval Shipyard on 16 July 1945, within hours of the Trinity test. USS Indianapolis set a speed record of 74 1⁄2 hours with an average speed of 29 knots (54 km/h) from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor which still stands today. Arriving at Pearl Harbor on 19 July, she raced on, unaccompanied, delivering the atomic weapon components to Tinian on 26 July.
Indianapolis was then sent to Guam […] and then on Leyte in the Philippines […] during which the ship was torpedoed by the Imperial Japanese Navy submarine I-58 and sank in about 12 minutes. Of 1,196 crewmen aboard, approximately 300 went down with the ship. The remaining 900 faced exposure, dehydration, saltwater poisoning, and shark attacks while floating with few lifeboats and almost no food or water. The Navy learned of the sinking when survivors were spotted four days later by the crew of a PV-1 Ventura on routine patrol. Only 317 survived.
The sinking of the USS Indianapolis – after the rush to deliver the materials for the atomic bomb – has become one of the legendary stories of War in the Pacific.
At the Potsdam Conference from July 17 to August 2, 1945, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Harry Truman met to negotiate terms for the end of World War II. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, called for the unconditional surrender of Japan with many of details left ambiguous, such as which members of the Japanese government was referred to by “[the elimination] for all time of the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest."
According to Secretary of State James Byrnes, at the close of the meeting on the afternoon of July 24, President Truman talked informally to Stalin. Later that evening, Truman reported to the Secretary that he had told Stalin that the United States had developed a new bomb, far more destructive than any other known bomb, and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered.
By the date of this conversation with Stalin, the Trinity atomic test had been successful and the needed uranium-235 for the Hiroshima bomb was aboard the USS Indianapolis that was mere hours away from Tinian Island where it soon would be assembled into the atomic bomb known as “Little Boy.”
Congressional Inquiry in the Cost
Another reason to use the bomb before Japan capitulated was that its use would justify the $2 billion cost (uninflated 1945 dollars; approximately $23 billion in 2007 dollars) of the Manhattan Project. If this expense was not justified by its use and subsequent glorification, President Truman likely would have faced a Congressional inquiry into the misappropriation of these funds. Not only would he and others want to avoid Congressional hearings, but Truman also wanted another term of office. His reelection would have a much more difficult campaign if political opponents could claim that he wasted money and American lives by shelving a weapon that, they would undoubtedly argue, could have ended the war quickly.
It is impossible to truly understand the motives and decision-making process of those men who selected the targets and gave the final orders. This article was not attempting to resolve those complex and unanswerable questions. Those are issues that go beyond the scope of this background article and which may have bearing on the thought processes behind the atomic bombings. Even after reading the diary of President Truman, it is not possible to understand his perspective completely, let alone the perspectives of all the other key players in the decision to the use the atomic bombs.
The fact that the atomic bombs were used, stands in witness to the calculations made by the chain of command. The fact that the Allies withheld the clarification to the Japanese government about the status of the Emperor until after all the bombs were dropped also stands in witness to the thought processes within the chain of command.
The Atomic Bombings and 9/11 Outreach
Many times, I have personally used this description of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki when encountering people who question my assertions that there is a problem with the story of 9/11.
I point out that the official story that we all have been taught about the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is that “they quickly ended the war with Japan.” I then say, that story is not true. I point out:
- The invasion of the Japanese mainland was scheduled for November, 1945 at the earliest – three months after the bombs were dropped
- Japan was in discussion about surrender through intermediaries
- In light of the Potsdam Declaration calling for unconditional surrender, the Japanese government was seeking needed assurances about the future role of the Emperor
- We dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki
- In the evening after the last bomb was dropped, the Allies communicated that the Emperor could remain
- Within days the Japanese government had accepted the surrender
- I conclude with the statement that “The atomic bombing were the ‘punctuation’ at the end of the war, they were not the reason for the reason for the end of the war”
- The story about 9/11 isn’t what you were told either
I then ask them to look into 9/11 as well as the atomic bombings of Japan. Over the years, the reception to using the suppressed story of the atomic bombings – in which government and media tell one story while omitting important information – has been very good for increasing the receptivity to the 9/11 reality.
People who question the statement, “the atomic bombing of Japan quickly ended the war” are labeled as “revisionist,” while the label applied to people who question 9/11 are called “conspiracy theorists.”